• 主 编:
  • 吕卫东
  • 主 任:
  • 王 倩
  • 刊 期:
  • 双月刊
  • 电 话:
  • 029-87092606;87092306
  • E-mail:
  • xuebaowq@263.net
  • 邮发代号:
  • 52-254
  • 创刊时间:
  • 2001年1月
  • 主办单位:
  • 西北农林科技大学
  • 主管单位:
  • 中华人民共和国教育部
  • 国内统一刊号:
  • CN 61-1376/C
  • 国际标准刊号:
  • ISSN 1009-9107
  • 编辑部地址:
  • 712100 陕西 杨凌 西北农林科大北校区34信箱
南锐,王竞杰.重大突发疫情防控常态化背景下农村应急合作的演化博弈分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2022,22(6):110~120
重大突发疫情防控常态化背景下农村应急合作的演化博弈分析
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Rural Emergency Cooperation Under the Background of Normalization of Epidemic Prevention and Control
  
DOI:
中文关键词:  应急合作  疫情防控常态化  农村应急  治理疲惫  演化博弈
英文关键词:emergency cooperation  normalization of epidemic prevention and control  rural emergency governance  exhaustion of governance  evolutionary game
基金项目:国家社会科学基金青年项目(18CGL033);北京市社会科学基金项目(20GLC044)
作者单位
南锐 (中国矿业大学(北京) 文法学院,北京 100083) 
王竞杰 (中国矿业大学(北京) 文法学院,北京 100083) 
摘要点击次数: 345
全文下载次数: 216
中文摘要:
      面对重大突发疫情,治理情境的复杂性及治理主体的局限性倒逼农村应急合作。疫情防控常态化背景下,农村应急合作易出现治理疲惫,诱发治理主体非合作博弈行为。针对农村应急合作中的非合作博弈行为,运用演化博弈方法,以村“两委”与基层政府为研究主体,分析农村应急合作策略组合的演进路径及其影响因素,并进行模拟仿真分析。研究发现,影响基层政府、村“两委”应急合作策略选择的因素分别为监管成本、应急成本与奖惩力度,农村应急合作路径为自治力量推动行政力量介入的“自下而上”型。基于实证结果提出了建立“县、乡、村”三级协调联动机制、完善农村应急监管机制和惩戒机制、赋能农村应急治理、减负基层政府的政策建议。
英文摘要:
      The complexity of governance situation and the limitation of its own ability require rural emergency cooperation.The normalization of epidemic prevention and control puts forward higher requirements for the durability and endurance of rural emergency management.Based on the non cooperative game behavior existing in the current rural emergency cooperation,using the evolutionary game method,taking the village two committees and grassroots government as the research subject,this paper analyzes the evolutionary path and influencing factors of the combination of rural emergency cooperation strategies.With the help of simulation tools,the dynamic evolution process of game participants and the influence process of parameter adjustment on the strategy choice of both sides are displayed.Through the research,it is found that the factors affecting the choice of government emergency cooperation strategy are supervision cost,the factors affecting the choice of emergency cooperation strategy of the two village committees are emergency cost and reward and punishment,and it is innovatively found that the path of rural emergency cooperation is “bottom up” autonomous forces to promote administrative intervention.Based on the empirical results,the paper gives policy suggestions to overcome the dilemma of rural emergency cooperation under the situation of normalization of epidemic prevention and control,in order to promote rural modernization.
查看全文  查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
关闭